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Introduction 
 
The global human rights regime has undergone profound transformation in recent decades.  It 
is now well-established in an increasingly sophisticated framework of treaties, institutions, 
networks and ambitious standards.  Marking a shift from the sterile positioning and inaction 
of the Cold War, the transmission of international human rights standards and their effective 
implementation at the domestic level emerged as a priority global concern in the 1990s and 
has continued to galvanise diverse actors.  The United Nations remains the principal 
international organisation (IGO) for legitimizing human rights norms and promoting efforts 
to secure improvement of human rights practice. However, the UN-centred regime is 
increasingly enmeshed in an extensive network of state and non-state governance actors 
operating at the bilateral, multilateral, regional and transgovernmental level. 
 
Notwithstanding advances made at the multilateral IGO level, especially in the area of norm 
creation and procedural innovation, concerns surrounding the persistent disjuncture between 
human rights standards and practice in many domestic jurisdictions have not abated.  In 
undermining the aspirational claim of universal human rights, this compliance gap presents a 
threat to the legitimacy of the project.  For some observers, global human rights governance 
is failing (Mchangama and Verdirame, 2013).  Recent social scientific research has suggested 
that states’ human rights treaty commitments have had a negligible, even counterproductive, 
effect on the rights performance of states – especially where they are needed most (Hafner-
Burton, 2013). In contrast, other statistical work has found some modest, but significant, 
positive effects conditional upon the presence of willing and able domestic compliance 
constituencies (Dai, 2007; Simmons, 2009). This is consistent with sociological research 
which highlights the central role of IGOs and their dedicated agencies in leveraging 
compliance with international commitments (Finnemore, 1996; Goodman and Jinks, 2004). 
 
What can be done?  Conflicting conclusions regarding the overall influence of the UN-
centred regime have provoked a lively prescriptive debate.  In line with prominent 
functionalist arguments of the 1990s, some scholars argue for enhanced capacity-building 
efforts to support states who genuinely wish to comply with their human rights obligations 
but find that they cannot (Börzel and Risse, 2013).  However, others see persistent violating 
behaviour as indicative of systemic design flaws which leave ‘false positives’ unaccountable 
– states which commit to UN treaties with no intention of complying (Simmons, 2009).  
 
This latter category highlights the inherent limitations of a supranational regime which lacks 
the necessary apparatus to enforce the ambitious governance objective of regulating domestic 
state behaviour (Moravscik, 2000). Some IR scholars have advocated structural reform of the 
UN to increase scrutiny of internal state practices and empower domestic constituencies 
(Weiss, 2012).  Others, disenchanted with the flaws of the existing global architecture, have 
advocated bypassing multilateral forums for more decentralised solutions whereby ‘Steward 
States’ engage directly with local human rights stakeholders (Hafner-Burton, 2013). Still 
other observers highlight the potential for regional-level organisations, especially in the 
Americas and Europe, to more effectively translate universal human rights norms to local 
political, institutional and normative realities (Lagon and Kaminski, 2014). 
 
Nevertheless, IGOs across issue areas, and especially in the human rights domain, continue to 
play a central role as legitimizers of norm creation as well as focal points for effective 
coordination in a global public domain defined by situations of complex interdependence, 
diverse interests, and uncertainty over causal relationships (de Búrca et al. 2013).  Against a 
backdrop of growing regime complexity, the orthodox governance models of old, whereby 
states delegate a clearly defined mandate and powers to an IGO – often characterised in terms 
of a principal-agent model – are increasingly giving way to new modes of pluralist 
governance.  
 
In particular, for our purposes, the principal-agent view of governance is less useful, if not 
inappropriate, when applied to global human rights governance.  In this domain, the task 
delegated to the agent (IGO) by the principal, or collective of principals (States), is generally 
to close compliance gaps by monitoring those same principals for possible human rights 
abuses and, where necessary, publicizing their violation.1 This introduces a high probability 
of ‘principal’s moral hazard’ with competing preferences among some authorizing actors 
posing a threat to the independent and effective action of the agent (Miller, 2005).  Indeed, as 
the operational focus has shifted towards implementation of an increasingly ambitious and 
open-ended governance framework, dedicated human rights agencies within UN structures 
have increasingly sought to bypass state consent by supporting and coordinating new forms 
of non-state and private authority. 
 
International relations (IR) scholarship has captured this type of governance arrangement 
using the concept of orchestration, which can be defined as when an IGO enlists and supports 
intermediary actors to address target actors in pursuit of IGO governance goals (Abbott & 
Snidal, 2009; Abbott et al., 2014). Orchestration, distinct from hierarchy, delegation and 
collaboration, occurs when: (1) the Orchestrator (IGO) seeks to influence the behaviour of the 
Target (State) via Intermediaries, and (2) the Orchestrator lacks authoritative control over the 
Intermediaries, which, in turn, lack the ability to compel compliance of the target.  This 
governance configuration represents a significant departure from principal-agent theory.  
Orchestration responds to a shift from fully integrated governance systems towards more 
dynamic models which display varying degrees of non-hierarchical relationships and 
functional differentiation across a multi-actor system. 
 
An emergent body of IR literature has identified a significant orchestration deficit both in 
practice and in scholarly work on international regimes (Jönsson, 2013).  Scholars have 
begun to enhance the conceptual precision around orchestration as well as probe the concept 
as a dependent variable (i.e. the conditions under which it emerges) and as an independent 
variable in explaining how IGOs as orchestrators may guide and shape the behaviour of states 
(Abbott et al. 2014, various).  However, scholars have under-specified what orchestration 
means as an independent variable for explaining the behaviour of the intermediary (or 
networks of intermediaries) – a central intervening factor for viable orchestration.  As 
intermediaries take centre stage as a possible missing link in the search for new ways to close 
compliance gaps, how do they react strategically to international opportunities to orchestrate 
activities?  When is orchestration a threat to an intermediary which directly interfaces with 
both orchestrator and target, and when and how does it present an opportunity for advancing 
its governance objectives? 
 
In this article, I explore what orchestration means for global human rights governance by 
focusing on the intermediary: in this case, National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) in the 
context of an established global human rights regime and orchestrator, the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).  While scholars have produced valuable insights 
into how IGOs (and the OHCHR in particular) have promoted the establishment of NHRIs by 
states (Cardenas, 2003; Pegram, 2010; Kim, 2013), the significance of this new class of 
formal organisation for human rights governance is still under-theorised and not well 
understood.2 To generate insight into the application of orchestration for human rights 
governance, we would want to identify a domain where the orchestrator addresses the target 
indirectly through soft (i.e. non-binding) instruments.  We would also want a situation where 
the orchestrator does not exercise hierarchical control over the intermediary, which, in turn, 
lacks coercive authority over the target.  The formal linkage between the OHCHR, NHRIs 
and states maps relatively straightforwardly onto this hypothetical framework, allowing for 
exploration of the important question of how, and under what conditions, multi-actor systems 
can achieve shared governance goals beyond the capabilities of any individual actor. 
 
I use the experience of NHRIs to further refine the concepts of managing versus bypassing 
states to capture how intermediaries are affected by and respond to new opportunities within 
IGO structures (Abbott et al., 2014).  I use the former concept to illustrate how NHRIs, 
facilitated by the OHCHR, have engaged directly with the target (states) in multilateral 
forums to shape their preferences and behaviour through informal channels, lobbying, and 
other initiatives designed to persuade government officials of the appropriateness of human 
rights-compliant behaviour.  I use the latter concept to highlight how NHRIs seek to 
influence states’ human rights performance indirectly by enhancing the influence of the 
orchestrator – providing information on compliance gaps to UN monitoring mechanisms and 
fortifying their own independent status and activities within UN procedures. 
 
This research is motivated by both positive and normative concerns.  On the one hand, it is 
problem-oriented with a focus on avenues through which IGOs and their intermediaries – 
notwithstanding the well-known constraints of the existing regime – may exercise a margin 
of independent action to advance human rights governance goals.  It is interested in the 
functional question of whether orchestration as a mode of governance is well-suited to a 
human rights governance function.  However, it also builds upon an emergent orchestration 
literature which highlights the propensity for hierarchy and political conflict to assert itself 
(Mattli and Seddon, 2014).  In particular, the potential for competition among intermediaries 
themselves is examined.  In this sense, it is also a normative inquiry.  It probes the key 
political questions of how this regulatory governance arrangement is connected to power 
structures, whose interests are being served, and whose values protected and promoted? 
(Hurrell, 2007: 112). In so doing, the limitations of orchestration as an analytical framework 
for explaining the compliance gap in human rights governance are also highlighted. 
Orchestration is a means to an end: actual implementation of human rights standards on the 
ground.  It is important not to lose sight of this ultimate governance objective. 
 
A note on methodology.  Given the uncertainty surrounding causal relationship in pluralist 
modes of governance, the approach adopted is one of careful descriptive inference.  The 
study does not therefore offer robust claims about variation in the emergence of orchestration, 
the breadth or depth of goal convergence, or the potential for orchestration to achieve the 
desired governance outcome.  However, drawing on Abbott et al. (2014), it does survey the 
plausibility of various causal propositions and probes deductively the larger impact of 
orchestration on actor behaviour and outcomes within a pluralist governance arrangement.  
To substantiate its claims, the article employs a range of documentary sources and qualitative 
evidence, including extensive human subjects work with key stakeholders. 
 
The article begins by outlining the orchestration governance model and its component parts 
in the context of indirect human rights governance.  The study then turns to the implications 
orchestration has had for NHRIs, focusing on two general modes of orchestration objectives: 
managing and bypassing states.  The article concludes by examining what the analysis means 
for global human rights governance and international organisations more generally. 
 
Human rights governance and orchestration 
 
The UN human rights regime is codified in a dense array of treaties, institutions, networks 
and standards.  The promotion of human rights has been a feature of the UN system since its 
inception.  However, for much of the Cold War, human rights were consigned to the margins 
of institutionalised cooperation efforts.  In effect, prior to the end of the Cold War, the UN 
human rights regime was limited by the veto power of member states, restrictive treaty 
mandates, limited financial and administrative resources, and few non-governmental partners 
at the bilateral, regional, and transnational level.  A transformed ecology defines 
contemporary human rights governance.  Propelled by the liberal internationalism of the 
1990s and an operational shift towards implementation, architectural innovation has resulted 
in heightened scrutiny of states’ human rights practices, ambitious and open-ended treaty 
mandates, the proliferation of dedicated institutional mechanisms at all levels, and enhanced 
access to UN procedures by non-state actors.  
 
Whether the overall influence of this growing regime complexity is positive or negative for 
human rights practices on the ground may be in dispute.  However, identifying and 
understanding the dynamics of this evolving governance system is important because it has 
significant implications for victims of human rights violations, as well as for the work of 
scholars, advocates and practitioners.  The state remains a prominent authority within human 
rights governance.  However, the exercise and effects of state power in this domain is 
undergoing significant change, impacted upon by the emergence of new forms of non-state 
and hybrid authority.  This development has important implications for human rights 
governance, creating opportunities for modes of governance which operate according to, but 
also extend beyond, the constraints of existing international regimes, such as orchestration. 
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Figure 1. United Nations human rights governance. 
 
Figure 1, as elaborated in Abbott et al. (2014: 14), distinguishes orchestration from other 
modes of governance and is applied in this instance to global human rights governance.  
Delineating modes of governance along two dimensions: (1) direct or indirect interface 
between the rule-advocate and the target, and (2) hard (mandatory, enforceable) versus soft 
(non-binding, exhortatory) rules yields four ideal types: hierarchy, delegation, collaboration 
and orchestration.  The location of actors in Figure 1 is inevitably highly stylized. In reality, 
governance schemes display variable degrees of ‘hardness’ and ‘directness’.  In turn, under 
different conditions, their location may vary.  However, importantly, this scheme sheds light 
on why and under what conditions different modes of influence are employed. 
 
Hard 
Soft 
Hierarchical human rights governance is a contemporary (and controversial) development.  
Rarely exercised, but nevertheless overtly coercive dimensions of human rights enforcement 
have been articulated in the doctrine ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and the UN Security Council 
has recognised human rights violations as a threat to international security.  In this instance, 
the rules are ‘hard’ (Chapter VII of the UN Charter) and ‘direct’ (enforced upon the target by 
the executive authority).  Necessarily, such interstate enforcement requires a high degree of 
goal convergence among members of the Security Council – a condition which is rarely met. 
 
Increasingly since the late 1980s, the UN has also relied on collaborative human rights 
governance. Working often at the request of government, various UN agencies have 
encouraged member states to improve their human rights performance through direct peer-to-
peer mechanisms of influence.  Member states have placed human rights on the agenda of the 
UN General Assembly – however, its resolutions are non-binding (i.e. soft).  Significantly, 
the introduction of the Human Rights Council (HRC) in 2006 was also accompanied by a 
new human rights mechanism: the Universal Periodic Review (UPR).  The UPR provides the 
opportunity for all states to voluntarily affirm the positive actions they have taken to improve 
human rights in their countries and subject their record to peer review.3 This mode of 
influence is reliant upon the voluntary cooperation of states themselves, indicating a high 
degree of goal convergence, with extremely limited, if any, delegation of authority to IGO 
actors.  Unsurprisingly, the impact of such mechanisms has been inconsistent, relying on 
‘good faith commitments’ by the target and collaborating states. 
 
Binding international human rights treaties are at the core of the international human rights 
system.  There are currently ten treaty bodies comprising committees of independent human 
rights experts who are formally delegated authority to supervise states’ compliance with their 
obligations under the core treaties.
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 A central function of the committees is the legal 
interpretation of treaties and development of jurisprudence developed to guide state practice 
(Mechlem, 2009). This legal focal point constitutes an example of delegative human rights 
governance, although its effectiveness in monitoring state practice is disputed (Geneva 
Academy, 2012).  More effective has been the development since the mid-1980s of a system 
of ‘Special Procedures’, independent human rights experts appointed by the HRC to report on 
thematic or country-specific mandates, which also incorporate international human rights 
obligations.5 Described as the “crown jewel” of the HRC,6 the Special Procedures system has 
nevertheless been subject to robust criticism and attempts by state actors to assert greater 
institutional control over their effective function and independence (Alston, 2011). 
 
Finally, the chief focus of this article, Orchestration, highlights how the OHCHR in Geneva 
and country teams (UNCT), working indirectly through intermediaries such as NGOs and 
NHRIs, have used their formal mandate, functional capabilities and legitimate authority to 
leverage a margin of independent action beyond the bounds of state agreement.  This mode of 
governance is particularly pertinent to an issue-area such as human rights which is generally 
not regarded as high politics (read: security) and therefore not subject to micro-management 
by major powers and their top-level officials. 
 
Extrapolating beyond the human rights domain, as Dai (2014: 240) observes, ‘what matters is 
not the issue area, but the strategic environment underlying a particular problem’.  Indeed, the 
strategic structures and problem sets material to this study of human rights governance may 
have broader applicability across thematic domains. Concretely, this study provides fertile 
terrain to explore three key hypotheses advanced by Abbott et al. (2014: 28) that IGO-led 
orchestration is more likely to arise under conditions of: (1) high goal divergence among 
states and/or between states and the IGO, (2) weak state oversight and institutional control 
mechanisms, and (3) availability of third-party intermediaries willing and able to jointly 
deepen the application of those rules.  A further important necessary condition – particularly 
pertinent to human rights governance – includes a rule framework which is amenable to rule-
entrepreneurship beyond the point of (some) states’ agreement.  An illustrative arena of 
human rights orchestration is provided in the next section. 
  
Mapping orchestration: means, motive and opportunity 
 
Orchestration occurs when an IGO enlists and supports intermediary actors to address target 
actors in pursuit of IGO governance goals (Abbott et al., 2014).  More specifically, it occurs 
when: (1) the Orchestrator (IGO) seeks to influence the behaviour of the Target (State) via 
Intermediaries, and (2) the Orchestrator lacks authoritative control over the Intermediaries, 
which, in turn, lack the ability to compel compliance of the target.   
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Figure 2. Indirect human rights governance through orchestration. 
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Figure 2 illustrates such an arrangement in the field of human rights governance.  According 
to the model, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) is the 
Orchestrator seeking to influence the behaviour and preference of the Target: states.  In the 
middle, at the interface between the orchestrator and target, are the Intermediary, NHRIs and 
their peer network: the UN-affiliated, but independent, International Coordinating Committee 
of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (ICCNI). 
 
The orchestrator 
 
Although nested within an IGO with a long record of human rights engagement, the OHCHR 
marks an important shift in terms of focalization of human rights within UN structures.  The 
High Commissioner has the rank of Under-Secretary General.  Appointment is made by the 
Secretary General, with the approval of the General Assembly.  The High Commissioner is 
the first UN human rights official to be granted ex officio authority to play ‘an active role’ in 
the prevention of human rights violations (van Boven, 2000).  The Commissioner is also 
mandated to promote an unrestrictive rights brief and work directly with government, all the 
main UN human rights bodies, the HRC, the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and 
the General Assembly.  Notably, the Director of the OHCHR’s predecessor body, the Centre 
for Human Rights, had no authority to engage in dialogue with member states (Clapham, 
1994: 564).  The office and its dedicated Secretariat, the OHCHR, is not, however, an 
independent UN agency, such as the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR).  It is subject to 
institutional control by the Secretary General and reports annually to member states within 
the HRC and to the General Assembly through ECOSOC.  
 
The OHCHR is expected to actively promote system-wide coordination.  As human rights 
norms and structures become more intrusive, it is perhaps inevitable that the governance 
objectives of the OHCHR have diverged yet further from the common denominator position 
of UN member states, notably those of repressive governments.  This tension is embodied in 
a mandate which is at odds with the ethos of an intergovernmental secretariat.  Forming part 
of the overall UN Secretariat, the OHCHR is obliged to maintain neutrality in its work.
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However, prominent former UN officials have questioned whether ‘neutrality’ is possible or 
appropriate for a Secretariat ‘that perceives itself as a trustee of human rights interests’.  
Instead, they emphasise the basing of decisions ‘on the law and on a fair and objective 
interpretation of the facts’ (van Boven, 2000: 148). While some officials within the OHCHR 
today echo this sentiment in nuanced terms,
8
 others deny any implication that they seek to 
influence Member States (their “employers”).9 
 
However, conflict is hard to avoid.  Drawing on Abbott et al.’s (2014: 28) IGO-specific 
hypotheses, the OHCHR offers a good candidate for IGO orchestration, exhibiting both high 
goal divergence with states and significant capability deficits (in terms of legal authority and 
resources). Public confrontations between the High Commissioner and rights-violating 
governments are frequent.  Powerful states, such as the US, have been accused of exercising 
veto powers over the reappointment of High Commissioners who have fallen out of favour.10 
The OHCHR has also remained under-resourced in comparison with other UN agencies 
(Boyle 2004).  As such, the High Commissioner and the OHCHR must often pursue their 
governance goals in the face of resistance by diverse Member States and attempts at micro-
management by the office’s proximate political body, the HRC (Lagon and Kaminski 2014).  
Indeed, one OHCHR official recalls “fighting like maniacs to retain the total independence of 
the OHCHR...from Member States” during the move from the discredited Commission to the 
new Human Rights Council in 2006.
11
 In sum, the activist imperative of the OHCHR within a 
UN system historically geared towards harmonizing governmental interests poses a 
formidable challenge to its mandate-holder.   
 
The OHCHR therefore is likely to engage in orchestration activities.  What of the means and 
opportunity?  The office has a long record of engaging with NGOs such as Amnesty 
International (AI) to monitor state compliance with international human rights standards 
(Martens, 2004).  However, the case study described here identifies an unusually articulated 
orchestration arrangement, distinct from informal ad hoc engagement with NGOs and other 
intermediaries.  Effectively, the OHCHR has sought to engineer the rapid proliferation of a 
new class of intermediary through both ideational and material channels of influence.  The 
UN has strongly promoted the creation of NHRIs in accordance with international guidelines 
on NHRI design: the Paris Principles.  Notably, this normative template emerged out of 
deliberations among NHRIs, rather than UN member states, at a workshop organised by the 
UN Centre for Human Rights in 1991.12 Subsequently endorsed without modification by the 
CHR and the General Assembly in 1993,
13
 this non-binding instrument has informed the 
rapid adoption of NHRIs globally. 
 
The massive influx of OHCHR resources to NHRI promotion is well-documented (Cardenas, 
2003).  In 1995, a Special Advisor on National Institutions to the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights was appointed.  This highly robust advocate, Brian Burdekin, the former Chief 
Commissioner of the Australian NHRI, is widely credited with having exercised a powerful – 
if sometimes contentious – influence over the ‘promotional phase’ of NHRI norm 
development (Rosenblum, 2012).  Stepping down in 2003, he was not replaced.  UN 
activities in the field of NHRIs have instead been formalised and expanded within OHCHR 
structures, with the creation of a National Institutions Unit in 2003 – currently the National 
Institutions and Regional Mechanisms Section (NIRMS).  Notably, some observers view the 
abolition of the Special Advisor position and the subsequent absence of an experienced NHRI 
practitioner within NIRMS as a backwards step (Yalden, 2014: 11). 
 
Nevertheless, the OHCHR engages in orthodox training and capacity-building programmes 
for NHRIs, alongside other UN agencies, UNCTs and NHRI regional partners, and unusually 
serves a core administrative function as Secretariat to the independent NHRI association: the 
ICCNI and its advisory and executive bodies.  The OHCHR continues to play a central 
orchestrating role in what some observers have termed a possible transition to a ‘critical 
consolidation and refinement’ phase, with a shift in focus away from formal institutional 
compliance (NHRIs established in accordance with the Paris Principles) towards  monitoring 
NHRI performance in closing domestic compliance gaps (Rosenblum, 2012: 323). 
 
 The intermediary 
 
National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) are independent national agencies that protect 
and promote human rights.  Although established in domestic legal processes, they have 
gained growing attention as a possible missing link in the transmission of international 
human rights norms and their implementation at the domestic level (Carver, 2010).  The most 
common models of NHRI are the National Human Rights Commission and National Human 
Rights Ombudsmen, which have a core human rights promotion and protection function, and 
are empowered to investigate ex officio as well as on receipt of individual complaints (Reif, 
2004).  In accordance with the Paris Principles, NHRIs are state-funded, but formally 
independent, human rights agencies, enacted by constitutional amendment or legislation, 
generally appointed by the legislature, and composed of representatives with human rights 
expertise, including civil society.  NHRIs are therefore uniquely situated in a chain of 
orchestration extending down to the domestic political system: accountable to multiple 
constituencies, serving as interlocutor between rights stakeholders, and able to facilitate state 
compliance across institutional domains. 
 
They offer a promising gateway for bridging the compliance gap between international 
human rights norms and domestic practice, serving as potential implementation mechanisms 
in their own right or in coordination with other sub-intermediaries.  Disenchantment with the 
effects of international agreements on domestic state practice strongly informs the 
widespread conception of NHRIs as local agents of international law.  Indeed, this role is 
emphasised in the Paris Principles which strongly recommend that NHRIs have an 
unrestrictive international human rights law mandate.  Related to this, an NHRI should also 
be given an express mandate to engage with international and regional organisations, and 
specifically the monitoring apparatus of the UN human rights machinery.  Reflecting the 
cumulative compliance pull of the Paris Principles, NHRIs created after 2000 are 
significantly more likely to have an explicit mandate to apply international human rights 
treaty law (Carver 2010: 7-9). 
 
As such, NHRIs possess a range of governance capabilities which make them desirable 
candidates for orchestration at the international level.  Effective NHRIs can ensure better 
understanding of local context, monitoring, follow-up and facilitating implementation of 
international human rights commitments.  Aiding this endeavour, the Paris Principles provide 
a minimum (perhaps, necessary) baseline regarding structure, form and legal basis and are 
widely regarded as important in ensuring independent and effective function (Carver 2000).  
In turn, orchestration with the UN can yield significant domestic benefits for NHRIs, 
legitimising their activities, encouraging stakeholder coordination, and elevating the NHRI as 
a national focal actor. International political and financial support can serve to underwrite the 
de facto independence of the NHRI at the local level with many NHRIs receiving significant 
funding from international agencies, including the OHCHR.  However, it is important to 
acknowledge the limitations of OHCHR orchestration as a platform for ensuring NHRIs are 
enabled to secure improvement of human rights practices.  Actual implementation is 
contingent on a host of local relational factors, potentially amenable to a domestically-
oriented theory of orchestration. 
 
Nevertheless, international engagement with UN human rights bodies can bolster an NHRI’s 
domestic mandate.  Publicising compliance gaps internationally may serve to ramp up 
pressure on state officials at home.  From 1996, participation rights of NHRIs have been 
gradually strengthened within the procedures of the Commission on Human Rights and its 
successor body, the HRC.  In this regard, Rule 7(b) issued by the HRC in 2007 was 
particularly significant, codifying NHRI participation rights in the formal rules of the new 
body.
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   As one NHRI official puts it, this was “one of the real ‘big bang’ moments”.
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Notwithstanding, by 2007 – shepherded by the OHCHR – NHRIs had become a fixture of 
UN activities in Geneva, and their integration continues to accelerate under the umbrella of 
an NHRI peer network: the ICCNI. 
 
The International Coordinating Committee of NHRIs.  Central to the growing integration of 
NHRIs within UN procedures is a novel collective intermediary structure, whose core 
component is a transgovernmental network composed of NHRIs deemed to be in compliance 
with the Paris Principles.  A growing number of actors are engaged in the promotion and 
ongoing monitoring of NHRIs, including civil society actors, steward states and NHRI 
regional partner organisations.  The hub for this activity is the autonomous but UN-affiliated 
International Coordinating Committee of NHRIs (ICCNI) and its Sub-Committee on 
Accreditation (SCA). The ICCNI is not a body composed of UN bureaucrats or member state 
delegates.  It is a transgovernmental association of NHRIs which serves as a collective 
intermediary at the UN with the consent of its membership.  In 2008, the ICCNI was 
formalised as a non-governmental association under Swiss law.  Widely recognised as the 
representative of NHRIs within the UN system, it has achieved formal status within UN 
structures although it is not a UN body.16  The work of the ICCNI is currently facilitated by 
the OHCHR secretariat through NIRMS.  However, echoing the novel insertion of the Paris 
Principles into UN procedures, the ICCNI is unique within UN governance arrangements.   
 
Significantly, the ICCNI has also positioned itself as the gatekeeper of the Principles, within, 
but independent of, UN structures.  In contrast to NGOs, for example, who must seek 
accreditation from the governmental ECOSOC, it is the ICCNI Sub-Committee on 
Accreditation (SCA) which grants NHRIs access to the UN human rights system.  The SCA 
operates a peer-review system, not a system of review led by UN Member States.  This body 
grants letter grades to NHRIs indicating ‘full compliance’ (A status), ‘partial compliance’ (B 
status), and ‘non-compliance’ (C status) with the Paris Principles.  This rule-making power 
represents an important source of authority for the intermediary (Mattli and Seddon 2014: 
459). The OHCHR supports the work of the ICCNI in monitoring NHRI compliance, serving 
as a permanent observer to the SCA and its Secretariat.  However, it is the SCA which makes 
the formal recommendation for accreditation to be forwarded on to the ICCNI Bureau for 
approval.  As NHRIs have become more visible within UN structures, the ICCNI and its 
gatekeeper function have attracted increased scrutiny from transnational advocacy 
organisations, notably the Asian NGO Network on NHRIs (ANNI), as well as Member States 
(Renshaw 2012). 
 
The ICCNI also serves as a transgovernmental advocacy organization to advance NHRI 
interests within UN structures.  Collective action on the part of ICCNI members has led to A-
status NHRIs being afforded participation rights in the HRC.  In a parallel diplomatic effort, 
NHRIs have also been integrated into core mechanisms of treaty compliance arrangements 
(Carver 2010).  Such breakthroughs continue to accelerate.  NHRI participation was further 
enhanced in the 2011 Human Rights Council Review, including explicit status among 
stakeholders and the right to intervene immediately following the State delegation.17 
Remarkably, with the 2011 review, NHRIs have now surpassed NGOs in their participation 
rights within Council proceedings.  In June 2012, astute diplomacy by the regional partner 
body, the Asia-Pacific Forum of NHRIs, alongside the Australian government delegation to 
the HRC, the traditional sponsor country for NHRI resolutions, led to the Council taking the 
momentous step of recommending to the General Assembly that it grant Paris Principles-
compliant NHRIs access to its own procedures in New York.
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 This would constitute 
unprecedented access for a non-governmental actor within the apex political body of the UN. 
 
As this discussion clearly shows, both orchestrator and intermediary display sufficient 
motive, means and opportunity to engage in indirect human rights governance through 
orchestration.  The symbiotic emergence of the OHCHR and NHRIs in the early 1990s in 
both ideational and material terms has served to reinforce expectations around shared 
governance objectives, as well as foster a pioneering example of orchestration based on 
functional differentiation at the international and domestic level.  However, this analysis also 
points to change.  While (many) NHRIs may be a product of promotional efforts by the 
OHCHR,
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 the formalisation and growing visibility of NHRIs within UN procedures has 
important implications for the orchestrator-intermediary relationship, serving potentially to 
reinforce or destabilise a voluntary governance arrangement.  NHRIs have reacted 
strategically and positively to opportunities to enmesh themselves within the international 
system.  However, the questions remain: when is orchestration a threat to an intermediary 
which directly interfaces with both orchestrator and target, and when and how does it present 
an opportunity for advancing its governance objectives? 
 
 What orchestration means for NHRIs 
 
Orchestration creates both opportunities and constraints for intermediaries such as NHRIs.  
From one standpoint, it offers new international opportunities for a national-level 
organisation to advance its mandate to protect and promote human rights at home.  As NHRIs 
become further enmeshed within UN procedures, they may also enhance the overall 
effectiveness of the UN human rights system.  The OHCHR has been an important partner in 
facilitating and seeking out opportunities for NHRIs to advance their governance goals within 
UN structures.  However, such an arrangement also poses significant challenges for the 
intermediary.  Two modes of orchestration merit particular attention: managing and 
bypassing states. 
 
Managing states 
 
First, orchestration provides the intermediary with the opportunity to engage directly with 
state officials to coordinate decision-making related to human rights law, policy and practice 
at the international level with significant domestic consequences.  For example, government 
delegations to Geneva may be responsive to NHRI counsel on how instructions from capital 
are implemented.  This is particularly the case for delegates from steward states – official 
supporters of UN human rights standards and its machinery.  However, it may also be the 
case for instrumentally-minded state delegations who, while ambiguous regarding the content 
of human rights standards, can nevertheless be persuaded of the extrinsic rewards of support.  
Australia has long been regarded as the traditional sponsor country for NHRI resolutions.  
However, bilateral lobbying of the Indian and Indonesian government delegations by NHRI 
norm entrepreneurs proved vital to the successful passage of the Paris Principles through the 
General Assembly in 1993.20 Direct lobbying by NHRI entrepreneurs of diverse government 
delegations continues to play a pivotal role.  The momentous 2012 HRC resolution on NHRIs 
was adopted by consensus following intensive negotiation by Asia-Pacific Forum 
representatives, alongside supportive government delegates. 
 
When states and the OHCHR disagree on governance goals, NHRIs may serve to bridge the 
gap.  NHRIs have been granted unprecedented access to a growing set of UN venues and 
contexts within which to inform decision-making about human rights policy.  Their status as 
state agencies can give them access and lobbying opportunities denied to OHCHR officials or 
NGOs.  Many senior NHRI representatives have experience working within government 
ministries, the diplomatic service, and other branches of the state.  Interpersonal networks and 
familiarity with target behaviour can serve to bolster the strategic influence of these ‘human 
rights diplomats’ (Roberts, 2012).  For example, in 2006, NHRI entrepreneurs, alongside 
senior OHCHR officials, successfully provided the draft text directly to the President of the 
Human Rights Council which would become Rule 7(b), granting NHRIs formal participation 
rights in the Council’s rules of procedure (Lee, 2011: 30).  During the 2011 review of the 
Human Rights Council, the Council President referred to NHRIs as “partners” in the Council 
and stated that NHRIs “should be given prominence” (Lee, 2011: 32).  As a senior OHCHR 
official puts it: 
 
“National institutions have matured; they are not seen [by states] as overtly 
threatening, as a threat to the system.  They are viewed as credible actors who can 
bring issues to the table.  They are “team players”, I suppose, if you want to call them 
that”.21 
 
Compliance with the Paris Principles by Member States now carries significant reputational 
rewards – amplifying the rule-making authority of the ICCNI.  Continued endorsement of ‘A 
status’ NHRIs by the HRC confers a seal of legitimacy that is gaining recognition in other 
UN forums.22 For the OHCHR and steward states, ‘A status’ NHRIs should offer a valuable 
source of information and a credible and independent voice to that of the government under 
review.23 However, concerns focus on NHRIs making an independent and effective 
contribution to the Council.  In particular, the practice of NHRIs contributing to official state 
reports may blur the line between government counsel and watchdog, echoing earlier 
ambiguities in NHRI practice.24 National Institutions also often find that their efforts to 
produce ‘shadow reports’ are impeded by government, through lack of resourcing and 
obstructive behaviour.25 Certainly, not all governments welcome the enhanced role of NHRIs 
within UN procedures.  The Chinese delegation to the Council privately objected to the 2012 
Resolution, indicating that while no veto would be exercised (or possible) at the HRC, further 
progress at the General Assembly would be blocked.26 
 
The growing status of NHRIs as ‘team players’ cuts both ways.  NHRI access provides 
unparalleled opportunities to inform human rights-relevant political and policy decisions 
within UN multilateral forums.  But it may incentivise states to exert greater institutional 
control over the NHRI – placing their de jure or de facto autonomy in jeopardy.  Such an 
eventuality poses a fundamental danger not only to the intermediary, but to the entire human 
rights orchestration enterprise, threatening to reverse the polarity to one where the Target 
instrumentalizes the Intermediary to influence the IGO – in effect, engineering a reverse-
orchestration.  This fear motivates claims of a ‘zero-sum game’ among potential competitor 
intermediaries, whereby NGOs find themselves crowded out of UN procedures by ineffective 
or – in the worst-case scenario – non-credible NHRIs.  A desire to contain or insulate the 
pressure from the UN human rights system does in all likelihood inform the strategic 
calculation of some Member States.  Notably, Algeria and Nigeria (each having a ‘B status’ 
NHRI) have argued for all NHRIs to be granted participation rights in Council proceedings, 
irrespective of ICCNI status (Lee, 2011: 24).  As one observer puts it: 
 
“...it is actually a very clever move because eventually you have two strong actors on 
the international scene from your own country, both of them state bodies – your 
government and your national institution. I think that it is an advantage rather than a 
disadvantage from the point of view of your standing, of your image”.27 
 
Certainly, image has played a role in the extraordinary proliferation of NHRIs through the 
1990s, bearing a similarity to how the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) convinced governments to adopt national science structures as important features 
of statehood (Finnemore, 1996).  This rationale continues to influence NHRI adoption, with 
government officials in contested territories, such as Kosovo and Taiwan, keen to establish 
National Institutions eligible for accreditation (and therefore standing within the HRC).  It is 
important, however, that the promotional imperative be balanced by consideration of how to 
ensure legitimate and effective NHRIs.  The potentially conflicting governance objectives of 
‘promotion’ versus ‘consolidation’ have provoked growing goal divergence between 
intermediary and orchestrator.  While the ICCNI, in cooperation with some officials within 
the OHCHR, has sought to strengthen the accreditation system based on the Paris Principles, 
officials within the highest echelons of the OHCHR have continued to insist on NHRI 
creation, and even accreditation, without sufficient critical reflection.   
 
The issue has become acute in recent years given that the majority of countries who are now 
contemplating NHRI adoption are those where strong resistance was encountered initially.  In 
highly unstable or autocratic contexts, the questions arise: what function does an NHRI serve 
and is early creation always advisable?  These new entrants may also test the integrity of 
ICCNI structures and deliberative processes, especially where they are granted ‘A Status’ 
accreditation and may therefore hold prominent positions within key bodies such as the 
ICCNI Bureau and the SCA.28 In mid-2012, the ICCNI SCA Chair was assumed by the 
Chairman of the Qatari National Human Rights Committee.  Observers question whether the 
Qatari NHRI should have been granted ‘A Status’ accreditation.
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 In March 2012 the 
Commissioner General of the Jordanian National Centre for Human Rights became ICCNI 
Chairperson – the official representative of the association.  The former Ambassador of 
Jordan to the UN, his appointment raised serious concerns within the NHRI community and 
among external observers.  To the relief of many, the Chairpersonship of the ICCNI rotated 
to the African region in early 2013, with the Chair of the South African Human Rights 
Commission duly appointed ICCNI Chairperson. 
 
The OHCHR has done much to facilitate and support cooperation among NHRIs during an 
initial promotional phase of governance.  However, as NHRIs have gained in capacity they 
have also begun to assert more autonomy, focused, above all, on protecting their privileged 
status as gatekeeper to international acceptance.  While some OHCHR officials have 
supported this shift, and the peer-review accreditation process, others have sought to steer the 
ICCNI’s governance agenda to align more with OHCHR priorities and the general UN ethos: 
open inclusive membership.  This resistance to deepening the application of rules speaks to 
the limitations of human rights orchestration within a UN inter-governmental system.  Some 
observers also point to orchestrator-drift, suggesting that NHRIs have been deprioritised 
within OHCHR structures, with prominent officials more focused on UN Country Teams and 
NGOs as preferred intermediaries and NIRMS demoted within the hierarchy.  Conversely, a 
minority of ‘hard-liners’ within the OHCHR voice frustration at resistance among certain 
NHRIs to a more robust policing of performance, as well as the vulnerability of an 
accreditation process based on peer-review.30 
 
The future credibility of the NHRI project is likely to hinge on enhancing the accreditation 
process to ensure that ‘A status’ is a meaningful reflection of both design and performance.  
To advance this governance objective, committed NHRIs within the ICCNI may need to 
renegotiate the orchestration architecture with the OHCHR, as well as confront resistance 
within their own ranks.  They  may also have to devise new strategies of indirect influence, 
building on formal achievements within UN structures, focused on bypassing (mobilising 
other actors in order to fortify their own independent status and activities) as much as 
managing the target. 
 
Bypassing states 
 
The growing constraints on the ICCNI pose fundamental dilemmas.  To what extent should it 
continue to participate in governance activities initiated by the OHCHR?  Or, to what extent 
should it strike out beyond the integrated UN human rights regime?  Close ties between the 
OHCHR and the NHRI project since their mutual inception underpin a high degree of 
symbiosis in their governance relationship.  However, the emergent rule-authority of the 
ICCNI challenges this assumption.  The objectives of a core constituency of NHRIs to extend 
self-governance beyond the point of state agreement (the 1993 General Assembly resolution) 
and to more rigorously apply admission rules to the club of internationally recognised NHRIs 
(the SCA) poses a challenge to goal convergence with the orchestrator, as well as the 
authority of states in applying a check on their authority over the intermediary.  As one NHRI 
entrepreneur remarks: 
 
We started out with the Paris Principles being a purely normative set of standards. 
There was nothing built into it about an accreditation process and frankly had there 
been we wouldn’t have stood a snowball’s chance in hell of getting it through the 
General Assembly.
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As such, this consolidation governance agenda forces NHRIs to seek out support and involve 
other organisations and actors at the margins of the UN regime, or beyond its boundaries.  An 
orchestration strategy of managing states has paid dividends, introducing the formal 
participation of NHRIs within the decision-making apparatus of UN human rights bodies.  
The challenge now confronting advocates of effective human rights governance is to ensure 
that these structures are actually enabled to secure human rights advances.  To advance this 
agenda, NHRIs must engage more effectively as an autonomous rule-entrepreneur working 
within and outside existing orchestration arrangements to advance their interests – shifting 
emphasis onto bypassing states.  The ICCNI and NHRI entrepreneurs have adopted three 
strategies in response to this imperative, aimed at making it difficult for obstructionist 
elements to veto a shift in governance strategy. 
 
Rule-authority: obligation and precision.  The ICCNI and its peer networks have been 
extremely successful in promoting NHRIs through the Paris Principles via a General 
Assembly resolution, a non-binding standard.  NHRIs have emerged as legitimate rule-
makers, but also rule gatekeepers.  Member states have deferred to the ICCNI and its 
monitoring apparatus on questions of NHRI participation within UN structures.  As one 
observer puts it, the Principles and working practices of the ICCNI have been effectively 
“endorsed by reference”.
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 The depth of formal integration of a non-governmental actor 
within UN procedures is unprecedented.  However, the Paris Principles remain non-binding.  
On a parallel track, NHRIs have sought to ‘harden’ the obligations arising from this 
international instrument.  This has entailed a dual strategy. First, working closely with 
Steward States, the APF in particular has lobbied to transform what remains a policy set by 
the ICCNI – that NHRI participation at the HRC should be limited to those fully Paris-
Principles compliant – into a procedural rule.  Paragraph 16 of the 2012 HRC Resolution 
recommending NHRI participation at the General Assembly seeks to formalise this policy in 
the official rulebook.33 
 
Second, the most important advance in the legal status of the Paris Principles has been their 
inclusion in treaty law, most notably in the Optional Protocol to the Torture Convention 
(OPCAT) and the Convention of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) (Carver 
2010). Both instruments envisage a potential role for NHRIs as designated monitoring bodies 
and instruct states to give due regard to the Paris Principles.34 This new generation of 
international treaty law represents a radical shift towards a three-tier monitoring arrangement, 
focused on enhancing coordination among human rights stakeholders at all levels.  It also 
represents the outer bounds of state agreement on the legitimate reach of global norms and 
structures into domestic politics.  Reference to the Paris Principles within these instruments is 
the result of skilful diplomacy by individual NHRI and OHCHR officials within highly 
challenging negotiation contexts.  Inclusion of NHRIs within binding treaty structures 
provides a legal focal point for their independent standing, distinct to the political arena of the 
HRC or General Assembly.  In effect, NHRIs have advanced their governance agenda 
through institutional channels which are designed to bypass (to some extent) state and even 
orchestrator oversight. 
 
The focus of NHRIs as rule-makers and gatekeepers has not only been on enhancing the 
obligation surrounding the Paris Principles, but also on their precision. Without formal 
authorisation by states, the ICCNI has nevertheless developed a jurisprudential function.  
Since 2006, the SCA has issued General Observations (GOs) as interpretative statements of 
the Paris Principles intended to guide institutional designers and reformers as well as 
standardise ICCNI accreditation decisions.  Cognisant of the imperfections of the Paris 
Principles, but wary of State capture in a process of official renegotiation, NHRI 
entrepreneurs have sought to informally refine the content of the Paris Principles.  In a series 
of GOs, the SCA has enhanced precision around questions of independence, restrictions on 
jurisdiction, complaint-handling, financial resourcing, among others.  The GOs have also 
increasingly addressed questions of actual norm implementation: NHRI performance.35 
Underlining the legal aspirations of this process, in mid-2012 the OHCHR sent a letter to the 
Irish government headed ‘legal advice’ referring to the GOs with respect to the proposed 
reform of the Irish NHRI. The intervention had significant domestic political consequences 
(Pegram, 2013: 60). 
 
The SCA, facilitated by the OHCHR, has also sought to ramp up implementation of the Paris 
Principles, in line with the guidance set down by the GOs.  Emphasis has been placed on the 
independence of the NHRI from government and its freedom to undertake a human rights 
mandate without higher instruction.  Success in the accreditation process not only confers a 
seal of legitimacy regarding participation within UN forums, it also casts judgement on the 
legitimate standing of the individual NHRI.  NHRIs are vulnerable to government 
interference at the domestic level.  The SCA and OHCHR have used the accreditation process 
to apply pressure on states that undermine the integrity of their NHRIs.  For example, the 
demotion to B Status of the Honduran commission in 2010 served to highlight the failure of 
the chairperson to maintain neutrality amidst a military coup d’état.  It also places the 
spotlight on the legitimate conduct of member states.  The demotion of the Sri Lankan NHRI 
in 2007 was invoked in HRC plenary as evidence of the state’s dereliction of duty.  
Sometimes downgrade can invoke a constructive response by states. Sometimes not. The 
threatened demotion of the Malaysian NHRI, for example, led to a commitment by 
government to strengthen the existing structure and regain A Status (Renshaw 2012). 
 
However, the emergence of a new non-governmental authority focused on narrowing state 
discretion has not been welcomed by those at the sharp end of downgrades.  Such 
developments could draw unwanted attention to a previously inconspicuous accreditation 
process.  For some independent experts, this marks a necessary shift towards transparency 
and participative decision-making (Rosenblum, 2012).  However, others caution that the 
accreditation process is more rigorous than any equivalent state-led UN procedure (in 
particular NGO accreditation through ECOSOC) and must be preserved.
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 As the next section 
illustrates, reinforcement and reformulation of the relationship between the ICCNI and 
OHCHR is likely to be crucial to this governance objective. 
 
Formalising orchestrator-intermediary boundaries.  The relationship between the ICCNI and 
OHCHR has been subject to change and adaptation.  In recent years, what began as often ad 
hoc interactions between an informal group of NHRI practitioners and the OHCHR has 
assumed more substantial form in step with the creation of the National Institutions Unit in 
2002 and establishment of the ICCNI as an independent association in 2008.  The OHCHR 
has facilitated this evolution of an autonomous NHRI infrastructure and its interlinkage with 
official UN procedures.  It has also retained a significant presence within the ICCNI.  The 
National Institutions and Regional Mechanisms Section (NIRMS) currently serves as 
Secretariat to the ICCNI and SCA.  The OHCHR is a permanent observer to the work of the 
SCA.  The ICCNI permanent representative in Geneva serves the ICCNI membership 
exclusively, but is located within NIRMS.  OHCHR orchestration has been a vital resource, 
both in terms of materially facilitating internal ICCNI decision-making, deliberation and 
international activities, and, most crucially, by legitimating the NHRI project within the UN 
body politic.  
 
However, as the ICCNI has formalised its own corporate identity and the governance 
objectives of these two actors have been more sharply defined, there has arisen a dynamic of 
competitive orchestration.  As orchestrator, the OHCHR must strike a delicate balance 
between facilitating the voluntary cooperation of the ICCNI in a joint governance enterprise 
without imposing an agenda or competing for resources.  This balance would appear to have 
been lost in recent years.  For example, controversy erupted in 2012 when it emerged that the 
first of three $300,000 Australian dollar allocations earmarked for ICCNI activities had 
instead been diverted by the OHCHR to fund the general budget of the NIRMS.  Given the 
limited funding and capacity of the ICCNI, this has acutely sharpened division between 
orchestrator and intermediary. It has also led to some within the ICCNI community 
advocating a formal decoupling and institutional independence from the OHCHR.  They 
contend that the ‘OHCHR has had too influential a role in colouring the ICCNI’s political 
perspectives and priorities’ (Lee, 2011: 41).  According to this proposal, the OHCHR would 
be re-indentified as an ICCNI ‘partner’, an equivalent status to the ICCNI’s four regional 
coordinating bodies.   
 
Politically, tensions have also arisen.  In particular, the momentous strides made in recent 
years in achieving formal NHRI recognition within UN procedures have often resulted not 
from the sustained advocacy of the ICCNI and its representative in Geneva but rather from 
the regional NHRI coordinating body for the Asia-Pacific, the Asia-Pacific Forum (APF).  
The ICCNI’s strategic engagement with the HRC has not always been successful – finding 
itself locked out of key negotiations.  The influence of the OHCHR in managing the approach 
and policy of the ICCNI has also been sharply criticised.  For example, the head of the 
NIRMS is reported to have ‘cautioned the [ICCNI] Chairperson against active [ICCNI] 
participation in the [2011 HRC] review, recommending a minimalist approach to 
engagement’ (Lee, 2011: 41).  This position was supported by the ICCNI Geneva 
representative, but opposed by the APF and ultimately overruled by the ICCNI Chairperson 
(Lee, 2011: 41).  In this instance, the OHCHR overstepped the bounds of orchestration to 
approximate a governor role, seeking to gain control over the intermediary. 
 
In response, a proposal to reformulate the arrangement between the ICCNI and OHCHR is 
gaining momentum.  Central to this idea is a decoupling of the OHCHR from ICCNI 
substantive and administrative activities through the creation of a stand-alone ICCNI 
Secretariat and relocation of the ICCNI Geneva representative outside NIRMS.  Currently, 
the ICCNI Chairperson is reliant upon the OHCHR or regional secretariats for support.  In 
effect, this would break the existing chain of orchestration and recast it with the ICCNI 
potentially asserting an active orchestration role in its own right.  Opposing voices question 
what kind of political leverage the ICCNI would have without the OHCHR serving as 
Secretariat.  However, notwithstanding diverse views on formalising boundaries, there is one 
core governance domain where all remain in agreement: the accreditation process.  OHCHR 
officials claim that their participation underwrites the credibility and independence of the 
SCA.  Indeed, the OHCHR plays an important role in legitimising a process which remains 
relatively closed to external review or verification.  Importantly also, the role of the OHCHR 
may serve to ensure that states remain willing to defer to the judgments of the SCA as 
authoritative.  As one observer puts it: 
 
 “...by having the OHCHR there as a Secretariat, they are providing the UN rubber 
stamp to the [SCA] without providing substantive input. They are the legitimizers of 
the process; we can “UN brand” what we are doing because we have the UN onboard 
as the secretariat”.37 
 
Decentralising Authority. As well as meeting the challenge of recalibrating orchestration 
overlaps, the ICCNI also has the opportunity to identify complementary overlaps with its 
‘partners’ or sub-intermediaries further down a chain of orchestration, and thereby enhance 
the efficiency with which it fulfils its governance objectives.  Reflecting the regional bloc 
formations of the UN, regional coordinating committees for Africa, the Americas, Asia-
Pacific and Europe play a prominent role within the ICCNI.  The Asia-Pacific Forum (APF) 
has been active in regional-level advocacy and support for NHRI activities since 1996.38 
Notably, until 2007 it administered its own accreditation process, since ‘suspended’ in light 
of advances made at the SCA.  Networks of transgovernmental NHRI have begun to 
consolidate across regions.  The Network of African NHRIs was created in 2007, with its 
Secretariat currently supporting the work of the South African ICCNI Chairperson.39 The 
European Group of NHRIs established its permanent Secretariat in 2012, modelled on the 
APF, and now employs a full-time Director.  The Americas is the outlier, a vocal minority 
resistant to efforts by the ICCNI Bureau and OHCHR to establish a regional Secretariat.  This 
increasingly dense arena of regional transgovernmental activity offers additional 
opportunities to identify how the ICCNI membership can be mobilised to engage 
meaningfully in advancing a human rights governance agenda. 
 
Greater prominence to regional coordinating committees within the work of the ICCNI may 
serve to strengthen the strategic voice of NHRIs within UN procedures, as well as provide 
additional points of access for engagement with regional and local rights stakeholders.  By 
decentralising authority to the regional level and encouraging greater participation in 
decision-making, the ICCNI may find it has greater leeway for innovation and 
experimentation, with no single set of actors (member states or others) able to veto or 
sanction the majority decision of the collective.  This shift towards decentralising authority 
has been prompted, to some extent, by growing concerns over the influence of the OHCHR, 
as well as the complexion of new entrants to ICCNI membership.  Diluting authority to 
regional groups may serve as a bulwark against orchestration blurring into delegation.  
However, this decentralisation to generate positive feedback loops will also require 
maintaining a strong legitimate centre.  Orchestration with the OHCHR will likely continue 
to be a vital element in this endeavour. 
 
Wider implications for global human rights governance 
 
Orchestration offers a window into an important and underappreciated domain of human 
rights governance. Exploring the relationship between the OHCHR and NHRIs has 
demonstrated how orchestration can serve to activate and even strengthen national structures 
dedicated to the promotion and protection of human rights.  This study highlights the 
untapped potential for regulating domestic state behaviour from within a UN-centred human 
rights infrastructure enmeshed in a web of state and non-state governance networks.  It is a 
formulation of influence distinct from dominant theoretical models in IR scholarship which 
focus on external pressure via transnational advocacy networks or the benevolent stewardship 
of liberal guardian states.  Instead, it locates diverse drivers of human rights governance 
within a global public domain defined by growing complexity, diversity of interests and 
preferences, and emergent official and non-state authority. 
 
The article finds that orchestration may be particularly well-suited to a human rights 
mobilisation function, with the study affirming a number of hypotheses advanced by Abbott 
et al. (2014) as increasing the likelihood of orchestration, including: (1) high goal divergence 
among states and/or between states and the IGO, (2) significant IGO capability deficits, (3) 
weak state oversight and institutional control mechanisms, and (4) availability of third-party 
intermediaries.  However, further factors also emerge as central to explaining orchestration in 
this study, including a rule framework amenable to rule-entrepreneurship by both orchestrator 
and intermediary.  In turn, these hypotheses might also be modified and applied to the 
intermediary in evaluating the likelihood that they will engage in orchestration.  A key 
consideration in this regard is to evaluate how the orchestrator can serve to ameliorate the 
capability deficits of the intermediary in terms of focality, authority and resources. A follow-
on research project will evaluate how NHRIs might instrumentalize international 
orchestration activities to discipline ‘principal moral hazard’ at the local level.   
 
This study has uncovered an unusually formalised arena of indirect human rights governance 
through orchestration within an integrated regime: the UN.  The OHCHR-NHRI complex 
bears the hallmarks of orchestration, with a legitimising focal actor facilitating and 
integrating NHRIs into a broader governance programme of action.  However, the extent of 
integration, with the intermediary formalised as an independent association within UN 
structures, combined with the orchestrator serving a core governance function as secretariat, 
represents a novel deepening of orchestration architecture.  It has achieved results, opening 
up UN forums to a new class of official but independent bodies able to report from the front 
line of domestic human rights advocacy. At their best, NHRIs have served as authoritative 
counterpoints to governments.  Robust and imaginative advocacy by NHRIs will continue to 
be crucial to affirming their independent status as team-players.  Notably, NHRIs have now 
surpassed NGOs – the traditional intermediary for the OHCHR – in their participation rights 
within UN proceedings.  In detailing this shift in intermediary focality of NHRIs and NGOs, 
the study also highlights the potential for competition among intermediaries.  As articulated 
by one observer: 
 
“I think that the only way for NHRIs to respond to the concerns sometimes raised is 
to prove that they are not mouthpieces for governments by being there, by being loud 
and by being critical. And NGOs have a role in keeping them to that standard”.40  
 As such, while this study augments our understanding of how orchestration functions within a 
human rights domain, it also provides more fine-grained insight into how this mode of 
governance shapes the behaviour of actors, in particular the incentives acting on the 
intermediary.  The focus of this study is necessary given the pivotal role played by 
intermediaries of directly interfacing with both orchestrator and target.  However, 
intermediaries are themselves strategic actors accountable to multiple (and often competing) 
constituencies and operate on structurally highly uneven playing fields.  In particular, careful 
scrutiny is required of intermediary relations with the target to ascertain their independent 
status and, by extension, the direction of influence within orchestration arrangements.  
Intermediaries are not vectors for IGO governance objectives, but rather voluntary partners 
whose willingness to engage is logically predicated on: (1) their governance objectives, (2) 
available venues for advancing those objectives, and (3) the relative likelihood of success 
mobilising through one or other available forums.  Change across one or more of these 
factors may serve to reinforce or destabilise the fragile equilibrium between orchestrator and 
intermediary and the orchestration enterprise more broadly.  The degree of deviation from 
intermediary preferences therefore also appears to be an important factor in explaining 
successful IGO orchestration. 
 
Sufficient goal convergence between orchestrator and intermediary is therefore a threshold 
condition for orchestration to work.  This study demonstrates the challenge posed by goal 
divergence and counterproductive attempts by an orchestrator to correct intermediary-drift.  
In this regard, it challenges the underlying assumption of orchestration based on voluntary 
coordination and non-hierarchical relations.  Implicit in the metaphor of an orchestrator is 
hierarchy, be it between conductor and orchestrator, or first and second violinist. The 
potential for power asymmetries to assert themselves is evident in this study, with the 
OHCHR’s promotional paradigm of formal institutional compliance (NHRI establishment) at 
odds with – an admittedly uneven and contested – shift by the ICCNI towards a focus on the 
end goal; the ability of ‘A Status’ NHRIs to actually secure human rights advances in 
domestic jurisdictions.  However, in accordance with Mattli and Seddon (2014), the study 
also speaks to the potential for the intermediary to challenge the authority of the orchestrator 
through rule-making power. 
 
In large part, conflict within the orchestration arrangement reflects linkages to power 
structures and shadows of authority cast by the OHCHR’s proximate political body, the 
Council, as well as within domestic political systems.  I have refined the concepts of 
managing and bypassing states to explore strategies through which the intermediaries have 
sought to recast orchestration at the international level to better reflect their interests and 
preferences.  In turn, the study provides additional insight into a central and largely 
unanticipated finding by Abbott et al. (2014: 43); the active encouragement of IGO 
orchestration by states.  This study suggests that states have actively supported OHCHR 
orchestration with NHRIs for a number of reasons, including goal convergence between the 
state and OHCHR, skilful advocacy by norm entrepreneurs within both orchestrator and 
intermediary structures, as well as for less normatively desirable reasons – most problematic 
of all with the intention of engineering a form of ‘reverse-orchestration’. 
 
However, this analysis also poses a more fundamental challenge to orchestration. It highlights 
the limitations of an IGO-focused conceptual framework to engage meaningfully with the 
compliance gap in human rights governance, both in descriptive and analytical terms.  
Specifically, orchestration offers valuable additional insight into why and under what 
conditions states may introduce and even formally strengthen NHRIs.  However, it is far 
more limited in its ability to explain a compliance gap principally located at the domestic 
level – a problem which requires examination of local political structures and the capability 
of intermediaries to exercise social influence (Goodman and Pegram 2012).  With some 
notable exceptions (Simmons 2009), this limitation reflects a broader absence within IR 
literature of engagement with a domestic politics of implementation (or orchestration), 
beyond formal institutional compliance. 
 
Notwithstanding, the challenge of orchestration within IGO settings is amply demonstrated in 
this study.  The well-publicised shortcoming of the UN human rights regime must 
nevertheless be balanced by the pragmatic observation that it remains one of very few 
governance venues with the potential to positively influence the exercise of state power.  As 
this study attests, we are witnessing the disaggregation of the traditional integrated regime 
and the growth of increasingly experimentalist pockets of networked governance.  New 
conventions and optional protocols are characterised by intrusive norm frameworks, the 
formalisation of multi-actor systems within core implementation activities, and modest but 
significant reallocations of authority.  The concepts of managing and bypassing states could 
be usefully extended to describe the way in which stakeholders within issue-specific pluralist 
regimes may strategically extend rules to the limits or beyond of state agreement, with a view 
to securing human rights governance goals.  In sum, the international human rights system 
remains a key focal point for global human rights governance.  Future effectiveness is likely 
to hinge on its ability to combine and connect with other organisations and actors at all levels 
in the construction of a legitimate and accountable global governance system. 
 
 
                                                
1 Alston (2011: 630-33) provides a thoughtful human rights-specific critique of principal-agent theory. 
2
 The NHRI can be defined as ‘a body which is established by a Government under the constitution, or by law 
or decree, the functions of which are specifically designed in terms of the promotion and protection of human 
rights’. See UN (1995: 4). 
3 UN UPR website: http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/upr/pages/uprmain.aspx;  
4 See http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/TreatyBodies.aspx  
5 See http://www.ohchr.org/en/HRBodies/SP/Pages/Welcomepage.aspx  
6 UN News Centre, ‘Annan calls on Human Rights Council to strive for unity, avoid familiar fault lines’, 29 
November 2006. 
7 Article 100, Charter of the United Nations. 
8 “Neutrality does not mean we do not have a position”. Confidential interview with OHCHR official. 
9 “We are an intergovernmental organisation so it would be a little bit unwise for us to influence...our employers 
or those who are actually setting the policy.” Confidential interview with NIRMS official. 
10 See The Guardian, ‘America forced me out, says Robinson’, 31 July 2002. 
11 Confidential interview with OHCHR official. 
12 See CHR Res. 1990/73, 7 March 1990, para. 3. 
13 Principles Relating to the Status and Functioning of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights, adopted by the UN Human Rights Commission, Res. 1992/54, 3 March 1992 and the UN 
General Assembly, Res. 48/134, 20 December 1993 
14 HRC, Res. 5/1, 18 June 2007. 
15 Interview with Ben Lee, UN Human Rights Mechanisms Manager to the Asia-Pacific Forum of NHRIs (12 
September 2012). 
16 See, for example, GA resolution A/RES/58/175, 10 March 2004. 
17 HRC, UN Doc. A/HRC/RES/16/21, 12 April 2011 
18 See HRC, UN Doc. A/HRC/20/L.15, 29 June 2012, para. 16 
19 Not all NHRIs are part of the international process described here. Many offices, particularly in Eastern 
Europe and Latin America, do not conform to the model promoted by the OHCHR. 
20 Interview with Brian Burdekin, former Special Advisor on National Institutions to the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (1995-2003) (7 May 2013).  
21 Confidential interview with OHCHR official. 
22 Most recently see HRC Resolution A/HRC/23/L.15, 7 June 2013. 
23 See submissions under the OHCHR-prepared Summary of Stakeholders’ Information to the UPR. 
24 56% of respondents to an OHCHR survey reported contributing to the official state report for submission to 
the UPR. See also Carver, 2000: 49. 
25 See for instance Luxembourg and Philippines Stakeholder Summary, 2nd Cycle of UPR 
26 Confidential interview with NHRI practitioner. 
27 Confidential interview with OHCHR official. 
28 NHRIs in highly unstable and autocratic settings, including Egypt, Jordan, Nepal and Qatar, have all been 
admitted to the ICC and accredited ‘A Status’ in recent years. 
29 Reservations would appear to be warranted.  In October 2013 the Chairman of the Qatar National Human 
Rights Committee robustly rejected allegations of labour rights abuses on behalf of the Qatari government. See 
Al Jazeera, ‘Qatar under the spotlight for workers’ rights’, 4 October 2013. 
30 Confidential interview with OHCHR official. 
31 Interview with Brian Burdekin, former Special Advisor on National Institutions to the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (1995-2003) (30 March 2012). 
32 Interview with Chris Sidoti, former Australian Human Rights Commissioner (1995-2000) (26 July 2012). 
33 See HRC Res. A/HRC/20/L.15, 29 June 2012, at 16 
34 OPCAT, Article 18(4); CRPD Article 33(2). 
35 See ICC Sub-Committee on Accreditation General Observations as adopted in Geneva in May 2013. 
36 Interview with Ben Lee (12 September 2012). 
37 Confidential interview with NHRI practitioner. 
38 See http://www.asiapacificforum.net/  
39 See http://www.nanhri.org/  
40 Interview with Chris Sidoti (26 July 2012). 
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